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Abstract   
The basic income (BI) scheme is a fundamental reform of the welfare state that has 
recently gained widespread attention. Proposals for different variants of BI schemes have 
emerged to account for varying political and societal goals. This study investigates what citi-
zens think about the idea of a BI, and to what extent citizens’ perceptions depend on the exact 
design of such a scheme and the context in which this policy is embedded. Empirically, we 
rely on conjoint experiments conducted in Finland and Switzerland - the two countries in 
which the introduction of a BI scheme has recently been discussed most intensely. We find 
that the level of public support for BI is higher in Finland than it is in Switzerland. Moreover, 
despite the contrasting designs of the BI proposals in the two countries, both Finnish and Swiss 
citizens tend to favor more generous schemes restricting non-nationals’ access to the provision.  
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Introduction 
Today’s welfare states consist of multifarious instruments and provisions for the social 
protection of people. However, these complex welfare systems are under pressure. On 
the one hand, the welfare state has recently reached its «silver age» as new social and 
financial demands put pressure on governments to retrench and restructure existing 
social provisions (Pierson, 2001; Shahidi, 2015). On the other hand, welfare state reforms 
have been influenced by a logic of social investment that focuses on the generation of work 
incentives and activation (Morel, Palier and Palme 2012; Fossati, 2018). A more fundamental 
reform of the welfare state that has recently gained attention is the universal basic income (BI) 
scheme. A BI is an “income granted to all members of society as a right without means testing 
or conditions” (Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014, p. 26). Most importantly, it is “independent of other 
sources of income (or wealth), employment or willingness to work, or living situation” (De 
Wispelaere and Stirton 2004: 521; Pateman 2004; see also Van Parijs, 1992, 1995, 2004).  Because 
such a reform would fundamentally deviate from the basic principles that undergird todays’ 
welfare states--namely prior contribution and reciprocity, the idea of a basic income has often 
been dismissed as politically unrealistic. Critics expect that popular support for it would be 
insufficient and cast doubt on its legitimacy and sustainability in case of implementation 
(Elster, 1986; Rothstein, 2017).  
Nevertheless, the majority of existing studies on the subject have discussed basic in-
come from a theoretical or normative perspective (e.g., Elster, 1986; Rothstein, 2017; Van Parijs, 
1992, 1995, 2004). Empirically, we know very little about popular support for BI schemes. Very 
few studies have actually investigated public opinion on such schemes, and even fewer have 
shed light on the conditions under which broad popular support for  this provision could be 
expected (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; Liebig & Mau, 2004; Pfeifer, 2009; see also recent data from 
the 8th round of the European Social Survey). Moreover, as we argue below, recent survey-
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based studies may severely overestimate actual public support for BI schemes and could thus 
lead to incorrect conclusions about how realistic the introduction of such schemes is. This is 
because instead of considering specific proposals with potential trade-offs and contingencies, 
existing surveys use general single-item questions, exploring agreement with the introduction 
of a BI or support for the state providing a basic income to all citizens. In this article, we there-
fore ask: 
Is there popular support for basic income schemes, and to what extent does citizens’ support 
depend on the exact design of such a scheme and the context in which this policy is embedded? 
We seek to provide a better understanding of BI support and the contingencies of this 
support by using conjoint experiments conducted in two countries: Finland and Switzerland. 
Conjoint analysis has recently gained popularity because it allows to conceptualize prefer-
ences and decisions as multidimensional choices (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014; 
Dermont 2018). We argue that this is particularly advantageous when analyzing preferences 
towards new (even hypothetical) policies that are characterized by various and varying attrib-
utes (e.g., benefits, costs, eligibility criteria etc.).  
We investigate citizens’ preferences in the two countries in which the introduction of a 
basic income scheme has recently been discussed most intensely (De Wispelaere, 2016a), and 
where, thus, at least some public debate has occurred. A focus on Switzerland and Finland and 
a comparison of these two cases enables us to gain insight into citizens’ support for BI schemes 
in different welfare state contexts, and in light of differently framed public debates. Thus, the 
present study contributes to the limited empirical literature on basic income. Some researchers 
have argued that research on BI schemes has not been “keeping up” with the increased interest 
that the issue has received in the political discourse (De Wispelaere, 2016b). By conceptualizing 
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public support for BI schemes as a result of multidimensional choices, and by analyzing citi-
zens’ preferences with a sophisticated experimental design, our study brings the research on 
BI up to speed both conceptually and methodologically.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our theoretical 
framework and the existing research that it is based on. We then introduce our methodological 
approach, the data we use, and the operationalization of the concepts we deploy. The follow-
ing section presents and discusses our empirical findings. The study concludes with a sum-
mary of the most important results and conclusions. 
 
Theoretical background 
Koistinen and  Perkiö (2014, p. 30)  identify four dimensions crucial to the understand-
ing of the political success or failure of a proposal for BI: (1) the qualities of the innovation 
itself, (2) the actors involved in the process and their positions, (3) culture, and (4) the economic 
and political context. According to the authors (2014, p. 29),  these four factors explain the 
“drivers and barriers” of 13 BI variants that were discussed in Finland over the last decades. 
Whereas the main conclusion of Koistinen and Perkiö’s work is that BI proposals can take 
many forms, we argue that their approach can also be applied fruitfully—from a cross-sec-
tional comparative perspective—to an analysis of public support for BI proposals. On the one 
hand, dimensions (2), (3), and (4) refer to potential contextual differences. Citizens’ preferences 
for BI proposals may differ across countries because cultural differences and the economic and 
political conditions within each country may affect the configuration and preferences of the 
actors involved. In contrast, dimension (1) indicates that citizens’ support for BI proposals may 
inherently depend on the specific design of a BI proposal.   
In the following sections, we use these two perspectives – the specific design of a BI 
proposal and the context within which it is introduced – to structure our theoretical discussion 
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and the subsequent empirical analysis. First and foremost, the policy design perspective sug-
gests that some characteristics inherent to BI proposals will affect the public support the pro-
posals enjoy in a general way, i.e., quite independently of the political, cultural, or economic 
context they are introduced in. For this reason, we proceed by discussing the various elements 
of BI schemes and deriving hypotheses about how the specific design of BI proposals is related 
to their public support. Given that we have only two cases, we do not seek to formulate and 
test hypotheses based on the contextual perspective. However, discussing several characteris-
tics of Finland and Switzerland helps us to present our two cases and form some expectations 
about the potential differences in BI support between the two countries.   
 
The innovation of a basic income  
A BI scheme mainly differs from  typical welfare schemes in three respects (De 
Wispelaere & Morales, 2016, p. 521 f.). First, BI schemes do not target households; rather, they 
are typically directly calculated and paid to an individual in the form of an income stream. 
Second, the coverage of BI schemes exceeds that of any other income support scheme. Third, 
and most importantly, in contrast to most welfare programs, BI is not contingent on employ-
ment or a person’s willingness to work.  
However, the specific design of  BI schemes can vary greatly (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 
2004; Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014; Van Parijs, 2004). De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004, p. 267)  pro-
vide a theoretical and conceptual discussion of the different dimensions and variants of BI 
proposals and they argue that empirical research on the subject should take this variety in BI 
designs into account (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004, p. 267).  We make use of this recommen-
dation at the individual level and assume that citizens’ support for a BI proposal is contingent 
on its specific characteristics, i.e., how exactly it is designed and what its goals are. 
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We thereby concentrate on the  aspects of BI schemes that most directly influence the 
goals and implications of  each scheme, namely its universality, conditionality, uniformity, and 
adequacy (Van Parijs, 2004).1 This choice reflects a recent shift in the discussions prevalent 
among proponents of basic income provisions  away from a rather normative debate on the 
welfare paradigm towards an evaluation of what the best or preferred variant of a BI scheme 
would be (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). Thus, at the citizen level, we identify three elements 
that help us  differentiate between different BI variants: (1) the level of a basic income, (2) its 
degree of universality with respect to non-nationals, and (3) how the BI combines with other 
welfare schemes (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). 
 
(1) The level of a basic income 
De Wispelaere and  Stirton (2004) have argued that BI proposals differ in  their ade-
quacy, i.e.,  the extent to which a BI proposal has the capacity to satisfy basic needs.  This 
observation naturally raises the question how an appropriate level of BI is to be defined (ibid.: 
271). A related question  has to do with how BI schemes treat children (De Wispelaere & 
Morales, 2016; Van Parijs, 2004). Typically, most BI propositions set different levels for chil-
dren and adults (Van Parijs, 2004).  The discussion above makes it clear that the goals of each 
BI scheme can be quite different from those of others and, accordingly, the proposed BI levels 
can factor such differences in. In other words, the size of a BI depends on the goal of the pos-
sible reform. For example, the provision may be meant as a transfer guaranteeing subsistence 
at a low level or as an income that enables the development of those depending on the income. 
Moreover, other factors, such as the specific context (i.e., living costs, regional opportunities) 
in which the measure is introduced, will affect the level of BI. We can thus conclude that citi-
zens’ preferences for a BI scheme will depend on the level of the basic income. However, for-
mulating expectations about whether a more generous or a more limited BI will be preferred 
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is not a straightforward task. Most importantly, the evaluation of these proposals will be 
strongly related to the goals attributed to the BI scheme. If such a program is conceptualized 
as an austerity measure, then a low-level BI should be preferred over more generous variants. 
Conversely, the opposite  should be true if the BI scheme is considered as a means to compen-
sate citizens for changing economic, and particularly labor market, conditions (Koistinen & 
Perkiö, 2014, p. 35). Hence, we hypothesize that the level of a BI affects citizens’ evaluation 
decisively, but whether citizens—on average—prefer a high or a low level of BI is an empirical 
question:  
H1: Preferences towards a BI scheme depend on the level of the payment. 
 
(2) The degree of universalism with respect to non-nationals  
According to De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004), the degree of universality is another 
crucial feature of BI proposals. Universality is mainly concerned with coverage, i.e., the size of 
the population covered by the BI scheme. The crucial debate  on this feature has to do with 
whether, and under what conditions, non-nationals (i.e., resident non-citizens) are eligible to 
receive a BI (Van Parijs, 2004). While the literature on welfare state provisions in general has 
repeatedly raised similar questions, the dilemma is even more pronounced when a basic in-
come scheme is concerned (Bay & Pedersen, 2006). Bay and  Pederson (2006) have shown that 
Norwegian survey respondents’ support for a BI scheme significantly drops when they  are 
explicitly informed that the scheme also includes non-citizens. This issue may be of particular 
importance in an “Age of Migration” (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012) when questions of sol-
idarity and deservingness (van Oorschot, 2006) and their relationship with support for the 
welfare state and anti-immigrant feelings are brought to the fore (Shutes, 2018; de Koster, 
Achterberg, & van der Waal, 2013; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; van der Waal, Achterberg, 
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Houtman, de Koster, & Manevska, 2010). Recent studies in the field have found that increas-
ingly, citizens tend to support more exclusive welfare state policies that treat nationals and 
non-nationals differently. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Citizens will prefer BI proposals that are more restrictive towards non-nationals compared to more 
universal proposals.  
 
(3) Basic income and other welfare schemes  
Another important aspect of BI proposals is whether a BI would replace or complement 
other social benefits, mainly social assistance and unemployment benefits. This issue relates 
to the distinction between proposals for a partial BI where the amount paid is not sufficient 
without an income from other sources, and offers of a full BI that would suffice to cover all 
living expenses (Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014, p. 30). These different models go hand in hand with 
varying ideological views (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). Neo-conservatives have repeatedly 
asked for a single welfare state scheme, i.e., a full BI that would replace all other programs 
(and if paid at a rather low level, might result in lower overall social expenditures (Murray, 
2008, p. 2)). In contrast, social-democratic forces argue that a (partial) BI scheme should always 
be accompanied by other types of social assistance (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004, p. 271). 
Based on these considerations, we hypothesize that citizens’ preferences towards a BI scheme 
will be influenced by whether and how other social assistance schemes will be affected by the 
introduction of a BI. Again, whether citizens in a specific context prefer one variant or another 
is an open question.  
H3: Preferences towards a BI scheme are related to whether other not social benefits complement the BI. 
A related question focuses on how a BI would be financed. Some authors argue that a BI may   
join other public expenses and be funded out of a pool of revenues collected from a variety of 
sources (Van Parijs, 2004, p. 10). Others think that specifically earmarked funding source, such 
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as a very broadly defined income tax or a massively expanded value-added tax, would be 
necessary, especially in the case of generous BI schemes (ibid.). As De Wispelaere (2016, p. 138) 
argues, the need for additional funding, and any potential increases  in the value-added tax, 
in particular, may strongly reduce public support for a BI scheme. Conversely, Gingrich (2014) 
has argued that direct taxes on income or revenue) are more salient to citizens than indirect 
taxes, such as the VAT, for welfare policies in general. Thus, direct income and revenue taxes 
are perceived as costlier and more inescapable than indirect ones, and may therefore more 
strongly affect public support for BI proposals. Given the nuances of these findings, we for-
mulate a general hypothesis:   
H4: Citizens’ support for BI proposals depends on the type of funding undergirding the provision.  
 
The influence of context 
Various researchers have emphasized that the success or failure of a specific proposal 
and the definition of its crucial elements depend on the context in which the debate on BI 
occurs. For example, De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004) have argued that support for  BI 
schemes largely depends on the “surrounding policy context.” Similarly, Koistinen and Perkiö 
(2014, p. 30) have emphasized the importance of cultural contingencies: a BI proposal must be 
in accordance with existing values, norms, and sensibilities. Moreover, a specific variant of a 
BI may have different real-world implications and effects in different contexts, depending on 
its interaction with already existing policies (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004).   
Some researchers have argued that the high degree of solidarity and support for gen-
erous social protections in Scandinavian welfare states provide good conditions for the ac-
ceptance of BI schemes that rely heavily on solidarity and mutual trust (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; 
De Wispelaere & Morales, 2016). Conversely, in liberal and conservative welfare states, basic 
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income schemes are typically perceived as a departure from the prevailing philosophy of so-
cial benefits based on means-testing or premised upon the idea that citizens must make con-
tributions to the system before receiving social benefits. These perceptions could lead us to 
expect that citizens living in social democratic welfare states have different preferences toward 
the provision of a basic income and its design than citizens who live in less generous welfare 
state contexts. However, as several studies have emphasized, the strong work ethic underlying 
the Nordic welfare model and the belief that full employment and an egalitarian wage struc-
ture can be supported through a combination of adequate economic and labor market policies 
starkly contrast with the idea of unconditionality (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; De Wispelaere & 
Morales, 2016; Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014).  
Moreover, the political goal behind a BI scheme and the way public debate is framed 
on the introduction of a BI scheme also affect how citizens evaluate the features of BI schemes 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). The initiators of a BI scheme have agenda-setting power, because 
their proposal will define the perspective from which a BI scheme will be discussed and eval-
uated.   
Thus, citizens’ preferences towards BI proposals may vary across contexts, mostly due 
to pre-existing welfare policies, but also if the framing of the actual and previous discussions 
on BI schemes differ considerably (see also Sloman, 2018). In other words, to account for this 
potential contextual heterogeneity, it is reasonable to test our hypotheses in different contexts. 
If the same preference pattern with respect to policy design can be found in such different 
environments, we could conclude that some characteristics inherent to BI schemes trigger pub-
lic opposition or support.  
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Research Design 
Based on these considerations about contextual differences and an unfamiliarity with 
the issue, our analysis focuses on two countries in which the idea of BI has recently been dis-
cussed  in the broader context of their  political process (see also Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014). 
More than anywhere else, in these countries the discussion of a BI is not hypothetical and 
utopian, but has opened a public debate on concrete proposals. These conditions are most ad-
vantageous to studying citizens’ preferences regarding BI schemes. At the same time, these 
two countries are significantly different from one another. Not only do they exhibit different 
pre-existing welfare policies, the framing of the current debate on BI also differs, as the follow-
ing summaries of the state of discussion in these two countries illustrate. Relatedly, recent 
survey data documents that public opinion on the introduction of a BI scheme varies consid-
erably between the two countries. Whereas in Finland, a majority of citizens tends to perceive 
BI favorably, the Swiss population ranks among Europe’s most skeptical about this provision, 
with a majority rejecting the idea of a BI (see Figure A.1).  
Since the 1980s, Finland has discussed several approaches to introducing a universal BI 
scheme using more than a dozen different models (Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014). Although all the 
proposals to introduce a BI in Finland have so far failed to gain a political majority (Koistinen 
& Perkiö, 2014), Finland would be a most likely case as far as the introduction of a basic income 
is concerned. Not only does the country have a long tradition of universal welfare policies, it 
has also witnessed a long-standing discussion of the idea of basic income in its academic and 
political discourse since the 1970s. Moreover, the idea has received support from important 
political, social, and academic actors. At the very beginning of these discussions, it was actors 
from the academic or left-green political field who launched initiatives in favor of a BI. More 
recently, the idea has received increasing support from larger political parties with different 
ideological backgrounds (Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014, p. 35). The most recent example was a BI 
12 
 
experiment announced by the center-right Finnish government in October 2015 that was in-
tended to examine the effect of a BI on work incentives. In a first step that started in January 
2017, 2,000 unemployed persons were randomly selected to receive a basic income of 560 Euros 
per month for a duration of two years (Kangas, 2016). This level of BI is lower than the unem-
ployment benefits the participants had previously been entitled to, but the treatment group 
receives the money unconditionally for the whole two years, even if they find a new job during 
this period. Overall, the BI variant implemented in the experiment is more closely associated 
with a liberal perspective on BI than a progressive one.2 
In the course of preparing the experiment, population surveys revealed a relatively 
strong support for a basic income project, with  69% of respondents reporting that they were  
generally in favor of a basic income (Kangas, 2016, p. 9 f.). Voters from the Swedish People’s 
Party (SPP), the Green League, and the Left alliance were most sympathetic to the proposal for 
a BI, and the lowest support was found among voters of the National Coalition Party and the 
Christian Democrats. However, even in these latter groups of voters, supporters of BI were a 
majority. Interestingly, voters of the Social Democratic Party also exhibited high approval 
rates, despite the fact that their party leaders were more skeptical about the experiment. 
In Switzerland, the issue was put on the political agenda by a popular initiative that 
sought to introduce a basic income scheme in Switzerland. A non-political committee sup-
ported by artists initiated the proposal for a BI, but only received weak support from the es-
tablished political system. All major parties rejected the initiative, and the government feared 
the consequences that such a measure would bear on the economy and the social security sys-
tem, arguing that a BI would greatly restructure the state and the economy. While the initiative 
did not explicitly define the precise design of the BI scheme, the initiators implicitly  proposed 
a progressive form of a sizeable BI of about 2,800 Euro per month in their campaign activities 
and explanations (De Wispelaere & Morales, 2016, p. 522). Although the popular initiative was 
rejected in the June 2016 ballot, roughly 23% of voters cast a “yes” vote, which is considerable 
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given the low support that the initiative garnered among the political elite. Survey analyses 
carried out in the aftermath of the vote revealed that “yes” voters argued that inequality 
should be reduced and the relation between the economy and society should be rethought, 
whereas opponents of the proposal questioned its financial sustainability and assumed that 
people’s incentives to work would be reduced (Caroni, 2017; Colombo, De Rocchi, Kurer, & 
Widmer, 2016).  
 
Data  
We collected the data used in the present study just after the national ballot vote on the 
BI initiative in June 2016 (Switzerland) and shortly after the publication of the Kela report in 
December 2016 (Finland). This timing implies that at the time of the survey, citizens’ aware-
ness of the issue was as high as possible, and voters—at least and most clearly in Switzerland—
had gone through an opinion formation process with respect to the idea of a BI. Roughly 1,000 
individuals completed the survey in both countries. Survey participants were recruited from 
country-specific online panels through Qualtrics, and the demographic and structural compo-
sition of the final sample generally corresponds to the Swiss and Finnish resident populations 
(see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The only exception to the general representativeness of the 
study is that older respondents are underrepresented in Switzerland, which might be caused 
by the use of online surveys.   
The online survey included a series of standard socio-economic, socio-demographic, 
and ideological questions, but the core element was a conjoint module designed to capture 
individual preferences towards varying BI schemes. The following results are based on this 
module, which is explained in more detail in the following paragraph. 
 
The methodological approach: A conjoint analysis 
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Methodologically, the present study follows Hainmueller et al. (2014) in using a fully 
randomized conjoint design.  This technique has recently gained increased attention in the 
political science literature, but remains under-utilized in comparative welfare state research. 
More precisely, in this factorial survey experiment respondents rate different policy proposals 
that are described by six attributes (see also Liebig & Mau, 2004 for a similar approach). These 
attributes refer to the four dimensions of BI schemes discussed in the theoretical part, namely 
the level of a basic income (for adults and children), the degree of universality with respect to 
non-citizens, and the interplay with other welfare schemes. An additional aspect that we con-
sider has to do with the source of funding for the BI scheme. Note that indirectly we also inte-
grate two of the more technical/administrative aspects of BI schemes but keep them constant 
(De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). On the one hand, the size of the monthly payment implies 
that the presented BI proposals  constitute income streams rather than stocks. Moreover, given 
that amounts are stipulated for both adults and children, the individual rather than the 
household is the standard unit. 
The levels of these attributes are randomly varied to generate different BI proposals 
(see Table A2). Since each respondent is exposed to seven paired policy proposals, i.e., we have 
seven measurements per respondent, we were able to collect enough information on all vary-
ing attribute combinations. 
Using this innovative research design has several advantages. First, in contrast to sin-
gle-item questions (e.g., “Overall, would you be against or in favor of having a basic income 
scheme in your country?”), this survey type takes into account how the specific design of a BI 
influences support. As discussed in the theoretical discussion, BI schemes have “many faces.” 
Moreover, the dimensions of a BI scheme may be combined in different ways to shape the 
goals and the desired effects of the reform (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). Hence, preferences 
for BI proposals correspond to multidimensional choices - a specific proposal consists of vari-
ous elements, some of which an individual may like and others reject.  Therefore, conjoint 
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analysis produces more valid and nuanced information on respondents’ preferences towards 
BI schemes.  
Second and relatedly, previous research has shown that even though the idea of a BI 
has received quite ample popular support, concrete proposals are evaluated much more criti-
cally. This pattern has been attributed to the diversity observable in the design and orientation 
of the BI schemes (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). This pattern fits the concept of “qualified 
support” (Bell, Gray, & Haggett, 2005; Dermont 2018), whereby citizens may like the general 
idea of a BI, but oppose specific proposals for good and varying reasons (see also Noguera & 
De Wispelaere, 2006). A conjoint design enables us to take these qualifications into account by 
asking individuals to rate concrete proposals that indeed vary with respect to their design and 
orientation. 
Third, since in the conjoint experiment we collect individual preferences on a series of 
varying BI proposals, we increase the comparability of responses across individuals but also 
across countries. To a certain extent, the design detaches individual responses from what these 
individuals “have in mind” due to the current debates in their country, since respondents are 
confronted with varying and potentially unfamiliar proposals. Better still, since we know the 
response corresponding to each concrete BI design, we can control for what respondents “had 
in mind” when providing their responses. This advantage may be particularly relevant when 
analyzing preferences towards new or hypothetical policies like the basic income. Regarding 
the latter, citizens have no real-world experiences and possibly limited knowledge that they 
can build their opinions upon. It is therefore relevant to specify potential trade-offs and con-
tingencies into the survey questions.  
To contextualize the stated preferences experiment, we explicitly asked respondents to 
envisage their decision as a hypothetical vote that would occur the following Sunday. For each 
paired policy variant, respondents had to indicate the likelihood that they would approve the 
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proposed variant in a referendum on a scale from 0 to 100 percent in decimal steps. Although 
an experiment never has the same consequences as a real-world vote, and therefore, by defi-
nition, has its advantages mainly with respect to internal rather than external validity, we ar-
gue that the chosen conjoint design enables us to come as close as possible to measuring real-
world support in a survey context. Providing the context of a ballot vote involves a behavioral 
component, i.e., it encourages respondents to think about real-world consequences and what 
they would do in such a voting situation. We admit that this framing is best suited for the Swiss 
study, where citizens are familiar with this kind of personal decision-making due to the fre-
quency of direct-democratic ballots. However, when interpreting the results, we need to con-
sider that the Finnish respondents were less acquainted with this voting situation. 
 
Empirical Results 
Our main interest is whether the characteristics of different BI proposals systematically 
influence the level of support they enjoy. For this purpose, Fig. 1 presents the average marginal 
component effects (AMCE) of the attributes characterizing a BI proposal. The AMCE represent 
the “marginal effect of an attribute averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining at-
tributes” (Hainmueller et al., 2014, p. 10).   
As Fig. 1 illustrates, the plots for the two countries have a similar pattern. The most 
consistent effect is the treatment of non-nationals. In accordance with our expectation (Hy-
pothesis 2), the more restrictive a BI proposal is with respect to resident non-citizens, the more 
strongly citizens support it. Hence, this finding lends support to the view that concerns about 
solidarity and inclusion are increasingly important in welfare state debates in general, and 
may be of pronounced relevance as far as a basic income is concerned (Bay & Pedersen, 2006). 
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Fig. 1: Policy attributes and the probability of support. Note: Average Marginal Component Effect 
(mean and 95% confidence interval). Full results can be found in the supplemental material 
 
However, not all variants of a BI require the same degree of solidarity. A generously 
designed BI implies stronger redistributive effects, and thus, an increased need for solidarity. 
In contrast, a BI conceptualized as an austerity measure may decrease society’s solidarity with 
the poor. This raises the question whether, against the backdrop of the findings about non-
nationals, people prefer BI variants with a low level of redistribution and solidarity in general. 
Our estimations imply that this is not the case. Citizens in both countries prefer more generous 
variants of a BI to more limited variants. This pattern is particularly pronounced in Switzer-
land where a generous monthly basic income of 2,500 CHF garners the highest support. In the 
context of the popular initiative and campaign, citizens implicitly understood this to be the 
amount in the BI proposal, despite the fact that the actual text produced by the initiative did 
not explicitly mention it. Hence, our finding may point to the fact that public opinion was 
influenced by the variant most strongly present in the discussion. Accordingly, the preference 
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for a generous variant of BI is also reflected in the level of payment meant for children. Con-
versely, in Finland, a high level of payment is less of a trigger for support. However, despite 
the government’s intention to test a BI in a rather liberal way, Finnish citizens also prefer more 
generous variants to their most restrictive counterparts. This finding is supported by both the 
conjoint analysis, i.e., the AMCE of policy attributes, and the individual-level results. Interest-
ingly, in Finland, left-wing individuals also are most supportive of BI proposals, despite the 
current “liberal” approach. Thus, not only do our results confirm Hypothesis 1 that the level 
of payment influences preferences towards a BI, they also suggest that citizens in both coun-
tries are not sympathetic  to a very minimalistic, liberal version of a BI, but rather prefer more 
generous, progressive proposals.  
Given these findings, two other results are of particular interest. First, citizens exhibit 
higher levels of support for a BI that exists alongside other social benefits (Hypothesis 3). 
Proposals for a BI that would replace all other social benefits tend to receive lower levels of 
support (however, this AMCE is only significant in the Finnish case). It must be noted that the 
wording in the conjoint module did not specify what “other benefits” refers to. Based on the 
discussions that had taken place in the two countries, which had mostly focused on social 
assistance and unemployment benefits, we assume that respondents had these core benefits in 
mind, but probably not more specific benefits, such as payments during maternal/parental 
leave or family allowances. The potential replacement of direct agricultural payments—which 
must be seen as an issue peculiar to the Swiss case3—does not affect our respondents’ 
evaluation of the proposals for a BI.  
Moreover, and related to Hypothesis 4, citizens do not have clear preferences regarding 
the (potential) funding of a (generous) BI, but tend to prefer proposals that finance potential 
costs by cutting back other government expenditures. We interpret the limited importance of 
this attribute to mean that people believe the arguments advanced by the proponents of the 
Swiss initiative and the Finnish government: namely, that a basic income would be cost neutral 
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or even allow for the government to save some of the funds currently financing alternative 
welfare schemes. In contrast, the likely trade-off between people’s preferred generous BI 
variants coesxisting along other social benefits and the tax levels required to make them 
sustainable seems to bear no impact on respondents’ opinion formation. 
Overall, so far, our results indicate that the “qualities of the innovation itself” 
(Koistinen & Perkiö, 2014, p. 30), i.e., its policy design, are relevant to the level of citizen sup-
port   that concrete BI proposals enjoy. Moreover, very similar preference structures with respect 
to the generosity of a BI scheme, the inclusion of non-nationals, and the combination of BI with 
other welfare state benefits can be observed in both countries, despite their many differences. 
Thus, whereas citizens in Finland and Switzerland may have different levels of general sup-
port for BI proposals (as documented in the 8th round of the European Social Survey), they 
tend to evaluate the different elements of a concrete BI scheme in a rather similar fashion. The 
idea of rather stable and generic individual preference structures receives further support from 
additional analyses in which we tested for group-specific preference patterns related to gen-
der, age, income, education, and left-right placement. These models demonstrate that the dif-
ferent groups do not significantly vary in how they evaluate the various elements of our BI 
proposals, and that the previously described patterns are highly stable. The results across dif-
ferent ideological groups can serve as an example here (see Figure A2, and other models in the 
supplementary materials). Our results show that right-leaning individuals in both countries 
do not prefer a liberal, low BI that would be expected to be in line with their ideological back-
ground. Rather, if they prefer any form of basic income, they prefer it to be quite generous. In 
addition, left-leaning respondents who have repeatedly shown more openness towards immi-
grants prefer variants of a BI that are restrictive with respect to non-nationals, similar to the 
preferences of citizens from the political center and right. These findings corroborate the ar-
gument that some characteristics inherent to proposals for BI and their related logic are rele-
vant to the support these proposals enjoy across citizens.  
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However, despite the fact that the preference structures associated with the preferred 
version of a BI scheme do not greatly vary across groups and contexts, the general level of sup-
port for BI proposals does vary. Figure 2 shows that support for BI proposals, measured as the 
mean probability of voting in favor of a respective proposal at the ballot, varies between the 
two countries (as well as across proposals, i.e., the different combinations of policy character-
istics). In Switzerland, a majority of the hypothetical proposals received a mean support lower 
than 50%, which suggests that they would most likely be rejected rather than accepted. Only 
one in five possible proposals had a mean support over 50%. The respective share is consider-
ably higher in Finland with 51% of all proposals garnering a mean support of over 50%. This 
suggests that Finnish citizens support more variants of a BI. This finding goes hand in hand 
with a higher general support for BI in Finland (50.2%, see supplementing materials) than in 
Switzerland where all possible combinations of a BI have a mean support of only 43.9%. 
Whereas we cannot directly compare these results to recent survey data from the European 
Social Survey, our findings lend further support to the idea that the single-item questions used 
in standard surveys may lead to an overly optimistic image of popular support for BI schemes. 
For example, according to the ESS data, a majority of Finnish respondents (rather) supports 
the introduction of a BI scheme in their country. However, our analysis suggests that such 
majority support is contingent on the design of the proposal and can only be expected for 
about half of all possible variants.  
Relatedly, another country difference concerns the association between individual-
level characterstics and the level of support. The inclusion of further individual-level variables 
in the hierarchical model in addition to the various policy attributes already included reveals 
that these personal characteristics are much more strongly related to BI support in Switzerland 
than in Finland. Whereas in Switzerland the observed pattern confirms that left-wing voters 
and individuals with low income and education are the strongest proponents of a BI, very few 
individual charateristics are significantly related to support for a BI in the Finnish sample.   
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Fig. 2. Mean support for UBI proposals. Distribution of the mean support per concept. A concept is a 
specific combination of policy characteristics 
 
Conclusions 
In this study, we investigated citizens’ attitudes towards the idea of a basic income, 
and most importantly, whether the specific design of a BI scheme and the context in which it 
is proposed impact the level of support it enjoys. Using conjoint experiments, we tested our 
hypotheses in Finland and Switzerland—two countries in which citizens have recently dis-
cussed the introduction of a basic income scheme most intensely and where important differ-
ences related to existing welfare policies and the framing of the BI debate exist.  
Our main finding suggests that whereas the general levels of support for BI proposals 
in Finland and Switzerland differ, preferences for policy design are highly consistent both 
across these countries and across social and ideological groups within them. This result im-
plies that the fundamental logic of specific BI proposals—in particular, the liberal or progres-
sive goals behind them and the treatment of non-nationals —generates quite general individ-
ual reactions that are independent of context.  More precisely, our conjoint analyses reveal that 
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citizens in both countries do not support the idea of a liberal BI income that could serve as an 
austerity measure for welfare state retrenchment and restructuring. Instead, they tend to favor 
more generous schemes that do not totally replace, but rather complement, other social bene-
fits. Moreover, the most consistent cross-country trigger of support for a BI proposal is a re-
strictive access for non-nationals. This finding may point to one of the crucial challenges to the 
introduction of a BI. In the “Age of Migration” (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012), questions of 
solidarity and deservingness (van Oorschot, 2006) as well as their relationship with support 
for the welfare state and anti-immigrant feelings have gained increased prominence (de Koster 
et al., 2013; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; van der Waal et al., 2010). The well documented 
dilemma between citizens’ demands for generous welfare state benefits for those in need and 
their preference for limited benefits for migrants may be of even higher relevance as far as a 
BI is concerned. Another challenge to the introduction of a BI scheme seems to relate to its 
funding. Our results suggest that, just like many proponents of BI schemes, citizens like to 
assume that a BI could be financed without levying new or additional taxes. Although this 
possibility is very unlikely for the generous variant citizens prefer, respondents do not seem 
to fully engage with this potential trade-off when forming their opinions on different BI vari-
ants.   
Nevertheless, the comparison between Finland and Switzerland provides interesting 
insights. As previously mentioned, in general Finnish respondents are more sympathetic to BI 
schemes. Theoretically, this finding confirms the argument that the status quo affects the level 
of support for reforms such as the introduction of a BI. In particular, in Switzerland a BI would 
contrast with existing policies more starkly than in Finland, where welfare policies have been 
characterized by the principle of universalism for a long time (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; De 
Wispelaere & Morales, 2016). In this vein, the experimental approach corroborates the general 
pattern found in recent ESS data, the most comprehensive comparative data available on Eu-
ropean support for a BI. However, it cautions against a potential pitfall of using these data.  It 
23 
 
suggests that general survey questions tend to overstate actual popular support because they 
miss important qualifications on individuals’ support. Moreover, the individual characteris-
tics of respondents are more influential in explaining support for a BI in Switzerland than in 
Finland. Similarly, in Switzerland, preferences for the design of a BI scheme seem to reflect the 
current debate more strongly, whereas in Finland, the dominant liberal activation frame does 
not factor into citizens’ preferences. These country differences may imply that citizens’ atti-
tudes and preferences towards BI proposals may also depend on the status quo (i.e., existent 
welfare states) and the differing political systems and processes at place in the countries con-
sidering the introduction of this scheme.  
The latter conclusion points to one of the limits of our study. Whereas we have argued 
that the comparison of Switzerland and Finland might provide a better understanding of how 
differences in current welfare systems influence attitudes towards BI proposals, our study’s 
potential in providing a complete picture of these dynamics eventually seems limited. When 
comparing only two countries, it is difficult to identify systematic differences in general. The 
present analysis suggests that the difference in our respondents’ previous engagement with 
the BI issue (e.g., having thought about and made a decision on a specific initiative on a ballot 
vs. having potentially followed a rather academic and administrative debate without much 
personal involvement) may have hampered comparability. This limitation entails several im-
plications for future research on BI, in particular, and social policy reforms, in general. First, 
when approaching individual attitudes towards the welfare state from a comparative perspec-
tive, future studies need to consider that citizens’ roles in reform processes will vary. Whether 
citizens are directly involved as veto players or not, may not only affect the real-world reform 
process, but could also influence what they tell us in a survey. In Switzerland, shortly after the 
vote, citizens were able and willing to differentiate between different proposals. In contrast, In 
Finland, the weaker associations between policy (and individual) characteristics and prefer-
ences for BI proposals may be a reflection of the administrative and academic nature of the 
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debate, in which regular citizens were much less involved. Moreover, expanding a study like 
ours to additional and more diverse country contexts will surely be relevant to learning more 
about how current welfare arrangements affect public opinion on future welfare state models 
and reforms. In particular, an interesting question has to do with whether differences in the 
general level of support for programs can also be observed across countries belonging to differ-
ent welfare state models, while preference structures, i.e., individual reactions to crucial dimen-
sions of the welfare state measures, such as the degree of universality, the level of redistribu-
tion, or costs and funding, are stable across contexts.  
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Notes 
1 De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004) also consider some more technical aspects of BI schemes, 
such as whether the payment is made to individuals or households or whether the money 
comes in the form of an income or a stock. Variety in these aspects, i.e., the implementation of 
a BI scheme, may also affect how individuals perceive a basic income scheme (Widerquist, 
Noguera, Vanderborght, & De Wispelaere, 2013). However, because our definition of a BI as-
sumes that it targets individuals and takes the form of an income stream, these aspects are 
outside the scope of our paper. 
2 However, in the experimental context, participants may receive the difference between the 
basic unemployment allowance and the basic income to ensure that no participant will suffer 
negative financial consequences. 
3 In Switzerland, the so called direct agricultural payments (Direktzahlungen) are intended to 
compensate for farmers’ contributions to the conservation of the landscape, supply security, 
and biodiversity. They are particularly needed because Swiss agriculture is often characterized 
by a lack of productivity and profitability caused by the small-scale of the production and the 
difficult topographical conditions in the country. Since the direct payments account for 
roughly one half of farmers’ income, some have even argued that these payments are a form 
of basic income for farmers. Thus, questions about whether and how these direct payments 
would be integrated are relevant to the discussion on basic income schemes. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
VARIABLE CH FIN 
Support, continuous 0–100 mean = 43.93 mean = 50.22 
Age   
 Young (35 years or younger) 35% 26% 
 Middle-aged (36–60 years) 56% 48% 
 Old (65 years and older) 8% 26% 
Gender   
 Men 50% 50% 
 Women 50% 50% 
Education   
 Low (<=compulsory level) 51% 10% 
 Middle (further education) 26% 58% 
 High (tertiary education) 23% 32% 
Income   
 Low (<= 5000 CHF/1800 EUR per month) 46% 32% 
 Middle (5001-9000 CHF/1800-3400 EUR per month) 38% 35% 
 High (>9000 CHF/3400 EUR per month) 17% 33% 
Left/Right   
 Far left  11% 15% 
 Left  18% 24% 
 Middle  23% 13% 
 Right  29% 25% 
 Far right 19% 24% 
Employment   
 Full-time (0/1)  44% 33% 
 Part-time (0/1) 22%   9% 
Relevance of BI, continuous 0–10 mean = 3.25 mean = 4.73 
Time to answer module   
 Linear mean = 4.77 min mean = 5.11 min 
N 1’029 1’041 
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Table A.2. Attribute List and Levels Used in the Conjoint Analysis 
 
ATTRIBUTES LEVELS SUI LEVELS FIN 
Amount for adults 1000 CHF per month 560 EUR per month 
 1750 CHF per month 1200 EUR per month 
 2500 CHF per month  1750 EUR per month 
 3000 CHF per month 2300 EUR per month 
Amount for children 250 CHF per month 170 EUR per month 
 450 CHF per month 300 EUR per month 
 625 CHF per month 430 EUR per month 
Entitlement Permanent residents 
 After 5 years of residence 
 After 10 years of residence 
Financing Value-added tax 
 Income tax 
 Transaction tax 
 Cutting back other government expenses 
Social security and wel-
fare programs 
Basic income replaces all existing measures 
Existing measures are cut back and additional to basic income 
Direct payments 
Basic income replaces direct payments 
Existing measures are cut back and additional to basic income 
 
 
Fig. A1. Attitudes towards a basic income scheme in Europe. Source: ESS 2016, round 8. 
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Fig. A.2. Conjoint analysis contingent on ideological group. Note: AMCE by ideological groups, sep-
arately estimated results for Finland and Switzerland. 
